Part 4
Analysis of Local Government Financial Statements
This section draws on Reason Foundation's review of fiscal year 2023 audited financial statements for 8,054 cities and 2,478 counties across the United States. For each government, we recorded fines, forfeitures, court fines, and similar revenue line items when they appeared in the financial statement, along with general revenue from the statement of activities. In the current dataset, 5,859 cities and 1,567 counties reported positive fines and forfeitures revenue with usable general revenue. Another 18 cities and 4 counties explicitly reported $0, and 1 city reported a negative adjustment.
The principal advantage of this dataset over the Census Bureau data used in Part 3 is reliability at the level of individual governments. Audited financial statements reflect official figures that have been reviewed and certified by independent auditors, and are thus more reliable than the survey and estimation methods used in the Census Bureau data. The dataset also reflects more recent activity, covering fiscal year 2023 compared to the 2022 Census data used in Part 3.
Local governments prepare their financial statements in accordance with standards issued by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board. Under these standards, fines and forfeitures are classified as program revenues rather than general revenues, meaning they are excluded from the general revenues line on the statement of activities even when the funds are deposited into a government's general fund and used to finance core operations. The reliance measure used in this section reflects the ratio of fines and forfeitures revenue to general revenues as defined under those standards and are not directly comparable to the figures from Part 3, which are based on the Census Bureau's unique revenue classification system.
4.1 Local Government Overview
Across the 7,441 cities and counties for which fines and forfeitures revenue was identified, local governments reported a combined total of $5.5B in fines and forfeitures in fiscal year 2023. This figure reflects only those governments for which relevant line items were identified in audited financial statements and should not be interpreted as a national total. For national and state-level estimates of aggregate collections, see Part 3.
The majority of cities and counties in this dataset report ratios well below 0.05, meaning fines and forfeitures amount to less than five cents for every dollar of general revenue. The average ratio is 0.02, or 2 cents in fines and forfeitures for every dollar in general revenue.
This pattern is consistent with the Census-based findings in Part 3 and with prior research reviewed in Part 2, suggesting that outright fiscal dependence on enforcement revenue is concentrated among a relatively small number of jurisdictions rather than being widespread.
Because fines and forfeitures are excluded from the denominator, this ratio exceeds 1.0 in some jurisdictions. A ratio above 1.0 does not mean that fines exceed total governmental revenues. It indicates that enforcement revenue is larger than the government's conventional tax-derived and unrestricted revenue base.
Across the cities and counties in this dataset for which fines and forfeitures revenue was identified, 275 local governments in 25 states reported fines and forfeitures exceeding $0.10 for every dollar of general revenues in fiscal year 2023, including 238 cities and 37 counties. 68 cities reported fines and forfeitures exceeding $0.30 for every dollar of general revenues, and 42 exceeded $0.50. 13 cities reported ratios at or above 1.0.
Among counties, 8 exceeded $0.20 for every dollar of general revenues and 5 exceeded $0.30.
On a per capita basis, 255 cities collected more than $100 per resident in fines and forfeitures, and 41 cities collected more than $500 per resident.
Jurisdictions by Fines and Forfeitures as % of General Revenue
Cities and counties where fines & forfeitures equal or exceed each share of general revenue, FY 2023
Click a bar to view the full list
Jurisdictions by Per Capita Fines and Forfeitures Revenue
Cities and counties where fines & forfeitures per resident reach each threshold, FY 2023
Click a bar to view the full list
High reliance is not evenly distributed across the country. It is concentrated heavily in a handful of Southern and South-Central states. Louisiana alone accounts for 57 of the 238 cities exceeding $0.10 for every dollar of general revenues, followed by Georgia (35), Tennessee (33), Illinois (24), and Oklahoma (23). Together, these five states account for nearly three-quarters of all cities in the dataset exceeding that threshold.
Among counties, Illinois (12), Georgia (8), Texas (7), South Carolina (5) account for the majority of high-reliance county governments.
Consistent with prior analyses, cities and counties most dependent on fines and forfeitures fall in the bottom quartile of the population distribution.24 This observation is also consistent with prior empirical evidence that government reliance on fines and forfeitures is most prominent among relatively small jurisdictions with limited tax bases.
While these audited financial statement data provide a more reliable basis for identifying specific high-reliance jurisdictions than the Census data used in Part 3, they have their own limitations. Coverage is not uniform across states, and in a small number of states, the dataset is too sparse to support reliable conclusions. Readers should interpret the absence of jurisdictions from the map and threshold charts as a reflection of data availability rather than low reliance. Complete financial statements for all governments included in this analysis are accessible through the interactive map below.
States with the Most Cities Highly Reliant on Fines and Forfeitures Revenue
Top 8 states by number of cities with fines & forfeitures at each share of general revenue, FY 2023
Per Capita Fine and Forfeiture Revenues by City Population
Cities with fines & forfeitures revenue, FY 2023; horizontal axis is the natural log of population
Ratio of Fine and Forfeiture Revenues to General Revenue by City Population
Cities with fines & forfeitures revenue, FY 2023; horizontal axis is the natural log of population
Audited Local Government Jurisdictions
| Name | State | Type | Fines / General Revenue | Per Capita Fines | Fines Field | Fines | General Revenue | Population | Financial Statement |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| McNary | Louisiana | City | 2.92 | $1,175 | Fines | $208,051 | $71,368 | 177 | |
| Port Vincent | Louisiana | City | 2.75 | $881 | Fines and Court Fees | $493,621 | $179,549 | 560 | |
| Kilbourne | Louisiana | City | 1.95 | $193 | Fines and Tickets | $75,587 | $38,706 | 391 | |
| Gadsden | Tennessee | City | 1.92 | $711 | Court Fines and Costs | $255,181 | $132,605 | 359 | |
| Turkey Creek | Louisiana | City | 1.89 | $1,059 | Fines and Forfeits | $396,143 | $209,700 | 374 | |
| Dodson | Louisiana | City | 1.71 | $637 | Fines & Forfeitures | $198,744 | $115,959 | 312 | |
| Henderson | Louisiana | City | 1.34 | $901 | Fines and Forfeitures | $1,510,945 | $1,129,293 | 1,677 | |
| Poulan | Georgia | City | 1.31 | $555 | Fines & Forfeitures | $426,447 | $325,579 | 768 | |
| Woodworth | Louisiana | City | 1.16 | $590 | Fines and Forfeitures | $1,418,822 | $1,224,264 | 2,406 | |
| Webb | Alabama | City | 1.14 | $225 | Fines and Forfeitures | $313,370 | $275,119 | 1,395 | |
| Orient | Illinois | City | 1.10 | $22 | Fees and Fines | $6,796 | $6,157 | 311 | |
| Seat Pleasant | Maryland | City | 1.09 | $926 | Fines | $4,206,572 | $3,863,564 | 4,544 | |
| Urania | Louisiana | City | 1.01 | $104 | Fines | $126,173 | $124,666 | 1,219 | |
| Englewood | Tennessee | City | 0.97 | $467 | Fines and Forfeitures | $767,918 | $792,252 | 1,645 | |
| Calhoun | Tennessee | City | 0.94 | $329 | Fines and Fees | $179,482 | $190,083 | 545 | |
| Linndale | Ohio | City | 0.94 | $8,885 | Fines Licenses and Permits | $2,452,201 | $2,613,381 | 276 | |
| Forest Hill | Louisiana | City | 0.94 | $649 | Fines and Forfeits | $447,692 | $477,135 | 690 | |
| Celina | Tennessee | City | 0.92 | $558 | Fines and Fees | $986,592 | $1,068,550 | 1,767 | |
| Lawtey | Florida | City | 0.91 | $276 | Fines and Forfeitures | $299,161 | $329,749 | 1,082 | |
| Stringtown | Oklahoma | City | 0.90 | $887 | Fines | $388,695 | $430,211 | 438 | |
| Pollock | Louisiana | City | 0.90 | $690 | Fines and Forfeitures | $358,074 | $396,412 | 519 | |
| Clayton | Louisiana | City | 0.90 | $1,574 | Fines and Forfeits | $498,921 | $555,549 | 317 | |
| Kershaw | South Carolina | City | 0.87 | $688 | Fines Fees Licenses and Permits | $1,590,225 | $1,835,088 | 2,311 | |
| Georgetown | Louisiana | City | 0.83 | $2,933 | Fines | $618,959 | $742,572 | 211 | |
| Cheneyville | Louisiana | City | 0.79 | $422 | Fines and Forfeitures | $286,498 | $360,498 | 679 |
4.2 Case Studies in Local Government Fines and Forfeitures Reliance
The jurisdictions identified in the preceding analysis tend to share common features. They are small, with limited tax bases and few alternative revenue sources. But the ways in which fiscal dependence on enforcement revenue manifests, and the reasons it has proven so difficult to dislodge, vary considerably depending on institutional structure, enforcement context, and local fiscal conditions. The five case studies presented here were selected from among the high-reliance jurisdictions in this dataset because each illuminates a distinct dimension of the incentive problems documented in Part 2.
Henderson, Louisiana
| FY 2023 Financial Snapshot — Henderson, Louisiana | |
|---|---|
| Fines & Forfeitures Revenue | $1,510,945 |
| Total Revenue | $3,632,988 |
| Fines as % of Total Revenue | 41.6% |
| General Revenue (GASB) | $1,129,293 |
| Fines-to-General Revenue Ratio | 1.34 |
| Public Safety Expenditures | $1,199,705 |
| Public Safety as % of Total Expenditures | 49.3% |
| Population | 1,785 |
| Per Capita Fines Revenue | $847 |
Revenue Breakdown
Henderson, Louisiana — fiscal year ending 2023
Henderson, La., is a small town of roughly 1,785 residents situated along Interstate 10 in St. Martin Parish. Perched at the western end of the Atchafalaya Basin bridge between Lafayette and Baton Rouge, the town has drawn attention as a speed trap for more than a decade.
In 2013, Henderson's assistant police chief was criminally charged with public payroll fraud, maintaining false records, and malfeasance in office after investigators discovered an illegal quota scheme that rewarded officers with enhanced hourly wages contingent on writing at least two tickets per hour.25 The assistant chief pleaded guilty, and Henderson's long-serving police chief committed to discontinuing the practice of concentrating enforcement at the I-10 Basin bridge corridor.26
Despite these enforcement actions, a 2019 investigation by The Advocate reported that Henderson raised just $8,433 in property taxes and $190,386 in sales taxes in fiscal year 2018, while fines made up approximately 85% of the town's revenues that year.27 At the time, Henderson Mayor Sherbin Collette told The Advocate "We don't have many resources … sales taxes in Henderson are virtually nil." Collette defended the town's ticket revenue on public safety grounds, saying "I am sure that we save lives every day, every hour."28
Henderson's FY 2023 financial statements show fines and forfeitures continuing to dwarf all other revenue sources, including taxes combined. In fiscal year 2023, Henderson reported $1,510,945 in fines and forfeitures revenue. That's equivalent to 1.34 times the town's general revenues, 41.6% of total revenues, or $847 per capita. By comparison, Henderson collected $16,182 in property tax revenue—roughly $9 per resident. Public safety accounted for nearly half of all expenditures, at 49.3% of total spending.
Louisiana's Act 87 justice system funding schedule, included in Henderson's financial statements, details the flow of fine revenue. Henderson collected approximately $1.58 million in criminal fines, court costs, and service fees during FY 2023. The town disbursed portions to state agencies including the Acadiana Criminalistics Laboratory, the Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement, and the Louisiana Supreme Court, but retained over $1.2 million as self-disbursed criminal fines.
Despite the town's stated lack of alternative revenue sources, Henderson has accumulated substantial reserves. The General Fund's unassigned fund balance stood at $3,424,999 at fiscal year-end. Total governmental fund balances reached $5,397,980, up from $4,375,899 the prior year. These reserves, built predominantly through enforcement revenue, complicate the fiscal necessity argument that town officials have advanced publicly.
Henderson provides an illustration of what happens when the institutional safeguards that normally separate revenue generation from the administration of justice are absent. The research reviewed in Part 2 identifies municipal courts as one of the strongest institutional predictors of fines and forfeitures reliance. Louisiana's mayor's court system, under which the mayor serves as judge in the town's court, is a particularly acute version of this dynamic, placing the authority to preside over a town's court in the hands of the same official responsible for its budget.29 The Louisiana Judicial College recommends that mayors appoint a magistrate to serve as judge if court revenues exceed 10% of a municipality's revenue, but many, including Henderson, have opted not to follow this recommendation.30
Poulan, Georgia
| FY 2023 Financial Snapshot — Poulan, Georgia | |
|---|---|
| Fines & Forfeitures Revenue | $426,447 |
| Total Revenue | $870,735 |
| Fines as % of Total Revenue | 49.0% |
| General Revenue (GASB) | $325,579 |
| Fines-to-General Revenue Ratio | 1.31 |
| Public Safety Expenditures | $396,884 |
| Public Safety as % of Total Expenditures | 52.6% |
| Population | 770 |
| Per Capita Fines Revenue | $554 |
Revenue Breakdown
Poulan, Georgia — fiscal year ending 2023
Poulan, Ga., is in Worth County and sits astride U.S. Route 82, a major east-west corridor in South Georgia.
In December 2009, the Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT) increased the speed limit on the portion of Route 82 that runs through Poulan from 45 mph to 55 mph after receiving complaints from motorists.31 The city collected nearly $895,000 in fines and forfeitures in the year leading up to the change.32 The decision to raise the speed limit was based on a "speed study" conducted by the GDOT which considered several factors including "topography of the land, curvature of the road, number of previous accidents that occurred on the road, number of homes and businesses, and the speed that was being adhered to by drivers."33 The Poulan City Attorney, Tommy Coleman, told the Albany Herald that "the city didn't want to do it," citing safety concerns but acknowledging that speed enforcement was a "significant source of revenue."34
By 2014, fines and forfeitures revenue in Poulan fell to $492,000—approximately 30% of the city's total revenue that year.35 Poulan Police Chief Larry Whisenant attributed part of the decline in ticket revenue to the new speed limit but also cited complaints from city residents that police were neglecting neighborhoods.36 Whisenant told the Atlanta Journal-Constitution "I thought I was the traffic guy, because I love traffic … Now I've realized I had to step back and do more community policing. And you can do both."37 The city nonetheless made headlines that year after a disgruntled Worth County resident erected a sign outside the city limits warning drivers of a "speed trap ahead."38
In fiscal year 2023, fines and forfeitures accounted for $426,447. That's nearly half (49.0%) of total revenues and 1.31 times the city's general revenues. Public safety absorbed more than half of all spending (52.6%). Poulan's tax base is broader than some of the other jurisdictions profiled in this section, with property taxes contributing $47,949, local option sales tax $81,239, and insurance premium tax $68,692. But total tax revenues of $251,783 amount to less than 60% of fine revenue, and fines exceed any individual tax source by a wide margin.
Poulan's financial statements also reveal that enforcement revenue supports more than just the General Fund's core operations. The city's water fund has posted operating losses in each of the last four years, averaging approximately $38,000 annually.39 The Statement of Cash Flows for fiscal year 2023 shows the General Fund paid $57,532 in water system invoices on the water fund's behalf, and the water fund owed the General Fund $81,944 at fiscal year-end.
Poulan offers a subtle but instructive illustration of the resource allocation tradeoff described in Part 2. When the state raised the speed limit through town, the resulting decline in enforcement revenue coincided with a shift in the department's orientation toward community policing. Chief Whisenant attributed the change to resident demands but acknowledged that it had not happened while traffic enforcement was more lucrative. Fines and forfeitures remain a substantial share of Poulan's budget, but the episode suggests that reducing the fiscal opportunity for revenue-oriented enforcement can, at least in part, reorient how a department allocates its attention. But the city's financial statements show that the broader fiscal dependency has proven durable.
Turner County, Georgia
| FY 2023 Financial Snapshot — Turner County, Georgia | |
|---|---|
| Fines & Forfeitures Revenue | $5,615,457 |
| Total Revenue | $15,648,123 |
| Fines as % of Total Revenue | 35.9% |
| General Revenue (GASB) | $7,623,549 |
| Fines-to-General Revenue Ratio | 0.74 |
| Public Safety Expenditures | $6,995,971 |
| Public Safety as % of Total Expenditures | 48.0% |
| Population | 7,882 |
| Per Capita Fines Revenue | $712 |
Revenue Breakdown
Turner County, Georgia — fiscal year ending 2023
Turner County is a rural county of approximately 7,882 residents in south-central Georgia. The county sits along the I-75 corridor, the route many travelers take to and from Florida.
The Turner County Sheriff's Office has maintained dedicated traffic enforcement units on I-75 for decades. Sheriff Andy Hester, who has led the office since 2012, told WALB that the intensive enforcement posture dates to the 1990s, when the fatality rate on the interstate was high and a prior sheriff put traffic units in place to slow drivers down.40 When a 2022 statewide initiative called Operation Slow Down encouraged law enforcement agencies to step up their highway presence, Hester noted matter-of-factly that nothing would change for his office: "I know that there's some state initiative to get out and slow people down, but we do that every day."41
The County's aggressive enforcement practices have nonetheless drawn scrutiny. In 2014, the Atlanta Journal-Constitution ranked Turner County 11th among Georgia's worst ticket traps by per-capita ticket revenue, reporting that the county had taken in over $2 million per year in traffic ticket revenue each year from 2009 through 2012.42 Hester acknowledged the ranking and confirmed that his office issues between 10,000 and 13,000 traffic violations per year, saying "I know we write a lot of tickets. I keep track of the tickets we write."43
In fiscal year 2023, Turner County reported $5,615,457 in fines and forfeitures. That figure translates to 35.9% of total revenues or $712 per resident. Turner County collected approximately $0.74 in fines and forfeitures for every $1 in general revenues. Public safety accounted for $6,995,971, or 48.0% of total expenditures.
Turner County stands apart from many jurisdictions in this report in that it involves no scandal, no enforcement action, and no public controversy about policing priorities. Hester's account is that the department is simply doing its job. Intensive traffic enforcement on a busy interstate corridor saves lives, and the revenue it generates is incidental to that purpose. That may well be true. But as Part 2 discusses, fiscal dependence on enforcement revenue can undermine public trust and compromise the legitimacy of law enforcement even in the absence of any wrongdoing. When a county derives more than a third of its total revenues from fines and forfeitures, the perception that enforcement is motivated by revenue becomes difficult to dispel regardless of the intentions behind it. Redirecting enforcement revenue away from the collecting government would not necessarily change how the department operates, but it would go a long way toward resolving the appearance of a conflict that the current arrangement inevitably creates.
Seat Pleasant, Maryland
| FY 2023 Financial Snapshot — Seat Pleasant, Maryland | |
|---|---|
| Fines & Forfeitures Revenue | $4,206,572 |
| Total Revenue | $16,999,346 |
| Fines as % of Total Revenue | 24.7% |
| General Revenue (GASB) | $3,863,564 |
| Fines-to-General Revenue Ratio | 1.09 |
| Public Safety Expenditures | $7,933,401 |
| Public Safety as % of Total Expenditures | 37.6% |
| Population | 4,544 |
| Per Capita Fines Revenue | $926 |
Revenue Breakdown
Seat Pleasant, Maryland — fiscal year ending 2023
Seat Pleasant is a small city of approximately 4,544 residents in Prince George's County, Md., located just inside the Washington, D.C., beltway. The city has operated an automated speed and red-light enforcement program since 2010, issuing $40 citations to drivers exceeding posted limits by 12 miles per hour or more in designated school zones and residential roads, and $75 fines for red light violations.44
The FY 2021 budget, presented to the City Council in May 2020, identified the expansion of the speed monitoring program as a budget priority and projected a 222% increase in what it termed "offender-based revenues" to help offset a projected $2.4 million decline in tax revenue attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic.45 Violation payments, including speed and red light camera fines alongside housing code penalties and parking citations, were projected to account for 64.6% of total General Fund revenue.46
In fiscal year 2023, Seat Pleasant reported $4,206,572 in fines revenue. That figure is 1.09 times the city's general revenues, meaning fine revenue exceeds the city's entire conventional tax-derived and unrestricted revenue base. Fines also comprised 24.7% of total revenues. Public safety expenditures of $7,933,401 accounted for 37.6% of total spending. Per capita fine revenue reached $926.
The city's auditors noted under required disclosures that Seat Pleasant "derives most of its revenues from the citizens of the City and automated enforcement." The city has accumulated a substantial reserve of $3,778,571 in restricted funds, with auditors specifying that the restriction arises from speed camera revenue and police seizures earmarked for public safety expenditures. Outstanding accounts receivable for red light and speed cameras stood at $2,991,435 at fiscal year-end, a balance that suggests either high fines volume, significant collection difficulty, or both.
As discussed in Part 5 of this report, Maryland law caps the share of speed camera revenue local governments may retain at 10% of total revenues after implementation costs, with amounts above that threshold remitted to the state comptroller.47 Seat Pleasant's fine revenue is well above that threshold relative to total revenues. The cap, however, applies narrowly to automated speed enforcement revenue and does not cover red light camera revenue or other fines, leaving substantial room for collection across multiple enforcement channels.
The city's FY 2023 financial statements also disclose a separate governance concern. In fiscal year 2024, auditors reported that the city had discovered approximately $1.4 million in suspected fraudulent credit card transactions occurring over the period from February 2022 through May 2023, which had been referred to law enforcement for investigation. That amount is material for a city of Seat Pleasant's size, and the fraud's occurrence during a period of fiscal stress—when the city was rapidly increasing enforcement revenues to offset declining tax revenues—warrants attention.
Seat Pleasant offers a clear illustration of the dynamic described in Part 2, in which revenue shortfalls drive increases in enforcement activity. Notably, speed and red-light cameras generate revenue continuously once installed, regardless of whether the fiscal conditions that prompted their deployment persist. Whether similar dynamics play out in traditional enforcement settings, where departments may expand enforcement capacity by hiring additional officers or acquiring new equipment during periods of fiscal stress, is an open question worth examining. If so, it may help explain the research finding that jurisdictions increase enforcement following revenue losses but do not reduce it when revenues recover.
Stringtown, Oklahoma
| FY 2023 Financial Snapshot — Stringtown, Oklahoma | |
|---|---|
| Fines & Forfeitures Revenue | $388,695 |
| Total Revenue | $938,718 |
| Fines as % of Total Revenue | 41.4% |
| General Revenue (GASB) | $430,211 |
| Fines-to-General Revenue Ratio | 0.90 |
| Public Safety Expenditures | $361,858 |
| Public Safety as % of Total Expenditures | 39.4% |
| Population | 407 |
| Per Capita Fines Revenue | $955 |
Revenue Breakdown
Stringtown, Oklahoma — fiscal year ending 2023
Stringtown is a small town of approximately 407 residents in Atoka County in southeastern Oklahoma, situated along U.S. Highway 69 between Tulsa and Dallas. The town has no significant commercial activity and a limited tax base; its largest employer is a medium-security state prison. For more than four decades, Stringtown has funded its government primarily through traffic enforcement on U.S. 69.
According to reporting by The Oklahoman, Stringtown generated $69,895 in total revenue in 1983 before the town began processing its own traffic citations.48 The following year, after taking on its own ticketing operations, revenue grew to $112,257. By the end of the decade, total revenue reached $513,807, with the vast majority attributable to traffic tickets. The city expanded from three full-time employees to 20, including six police officers, and fine revenue funded the construction of a new city hall and a new police station.49
As discussed in Part 5 of this report, Oklahoma law prohibits towns from generating more than 50% of municipal revenue through traffic enforcement.50 Stringtown has violated this cap repeatedly.51 In the mid-2000s, the state stripped Stringtown's officers of their authority to write tickets along U.S. 69, effectively shutting the department down.52
The department was subsequently reconstituted, and by fiscal years 2012 and 2013 fines again represented 73% and 76% of all town revenue, respectively.53 In January 2014, following an investigation requested by the state attorney general's office, the Oklahoma Department of Public Safety announced that Stringtown's police department would no longer be permitted to enforce traffic laws on state and federal highways.54 The department was disbanded that year.55
Stringtown's police department has since been reconstituted again, and in fiscal year 2023, fines and recovery revenue of $388,695 represented 41.4% of total revenues and 0.90 times the town's general revenues. Police protection expenditures of $361,858 accounted for 39.4% of total spending.
Stringtown's four-decade history of enforcement actions, shutdowns, and reconstitutions illustrates a core theme of this report. When the incentive to rely on enforcement revenue is structural, penalties and enforcement actions that target behavior without addressing the underlying fiscal incentive are unlikely to produce durable change. Stringtown has been stripped of citation authority multiple times, its police department disbanded and reconstituted on two separate occasions, and yet the pattern persists. As Part 2 argues, durable reform requires changing the incentives.
Notes
- 24 Shannon R. Graham and Michael D. Makowsky, "Local Government Dependence on Criminal Justice Revenue and Emerging Constraints," Annual Review of Criminology 4 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-criminol-061020-021824.
- 25 Richard Burgess, "Basin blues: Ex-Henderson official sentenced for illegal police bonuses in traffic ticket quota scheme," The Acadiana Advocate, 24 Apr. 2016. https://www.theadvocate.com/acadiana/news/basin-blues-ex-henderson-official-sentenced-for-illegal-police-bonuses-in-traffic-ticket-quota-scheme/article_be3e89c0-0521-5fca-9014-47a2c4bbd3aa.html.
- 26 Ibid.
- 27 Mark Ballard, "A growing number of towns rely on speeding ticket fines; Here's how officials are trying to change that." The Advocate, 9 Mar 2019. https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/politics/legislature/a-growing-number-of-towns-rely-on-speeding-ticket-fines-heres-how-officials-are-trying/article_baf2b54c-3b7a-11e9-be3c-cb983a12c2d6.html.
- 28 Ibid.
- 29 Samantha Sunne, Dannah Sauer and Lee Zurik, "Louisiana mayors preside over their town courts despite guidance saying they shouldn't," Louisiana Illuminator, 17 Dec 2023. https://lailluminator.com/2023/12/17/mayors-courts/.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 Ricki Barker, Poulan speed limit increased, The Albany Herald, 1 Dec. 2009. https://albanyherald.com/news/poulan-speed-limit-increased/.
- 32 Georgia Department of Community Affairs, Report of Local Government Finances annual survey. Available at: https://ted.cviog.uga.edu/.
- 33 Ricki Barker, Poulan speed limit increased, The Albany Herald, 1 Dec. 2009.
- 34 Ibid.
- 35 Georgia Department of Community Affairs, Report of Local Government Finances annual survey. Available at: https://ted.cviog.uga.edu/.
- 36 Andria Simmons, Some rural Georgia towns policing for profit, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 22 Oct. 2014. https://www.ajc.com/news/local/some-rural-georgia-towns-policing-for-profit/wdYjcTlZsqUo8Px07C48VJ/.
- 37 Ibid.
- 38 'Speed Trap' sign stirs up Poulan area, WALB. https://www.walb.com/story/26204559/speed-trap-sign-stirs-up-poulan-area/.
- 39 Water Fund operating losses were $34,330 (FY2020), $1,436 (FY2021), $36,788 (FY2022), and $81,455 (FY2023); four-year average of $38,502. Annual financial reports for Poulan, Georgia are available from The Tax and Expenditure Data Center for Georgia Local Governments: https://ted.cviog.uga.edu/FINANCIAL-DOCUMENTS/financial-reports.
- 40 "Turner Co. Sheriff's Office continues to crack down on interstate speeders," WALB, July 22, 2022. https://www.walb.com/2022/07/22/turner-co-sheriffs-office-continues-crack-down-interstate-speeders/.
- 41 Ibid.
- 42 "Turner Co. tickets necessary, sheriff says," WALB, Oct. 21, 2014. https://www.walb.com/story/26849406/turner-co-tickets-necessary-sheriff-says/.
- 43 Ibid.
- 44 City of Seat Pleasant, Automated Enforcement Program. https://www.seatpleasantmd.gov/317/Automated-Enforcement.
- 45 City of Seat Pleasant, Fiscal Year 2021 Approved Annual Budget, at pp. 4–5. https://www.seatpleasantmd.gov/Archive/ViewFile/Item/153.
- 46 Ibid.
- 47 Md. Code, Transp. § 21-809(i).
- 48 Andrew Knittle, "Paid traffic tickets helped build Oklahoma town's city hall, police department," The Oklahoman, Jan. 26, 2014. https://www.oklahoman.com/story/news/state/2014/01/26/paid-traffic-tickets-helped-build-oklahoma-towns-city-hall-police-department/60849453007/.
- 49 Ibid.
- 50 Okla. Stat. § 2-117.
- 51 Andrew Knittle, "Paid traffic tickets helped build Oklahoma town's city hall, police department," The Oklahoman, Jan. 26, 2014.
- 52 Ibid.
- 53 Ibid.
- 54 Andrew Knittle, "Investigation: Oklahoma towns continue to get away with speed traps," Tulsa World, Jan. 2014. https://tulsaworld.com/news/state-and-regional/investigation-oklahoma-towns-continue-to-get-away-with-speed-traps/article_66125e39-b794-5992-8f57-8487d5669203.html.
- 55 "Speed trap profits could come to end in small towns, with new laws," CBS News, Aug. 17, 2015. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/speed-trap-profits-could-come-end-small-town-new-laws/.